We examine how auditors perceive managerial overconfidence during audit reporting by testing the relationship between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing a first-time going-concern modified audit opinion to financially distressed firms. After controlling for the factors affecting auditor's going-concern modified audit opinion decision, we find that the likelihood of issuing a first-time going-concern modified audit opinion is positively associated with managerial overconfidence, suggesting that auditors adversely value overconfident management in financially distressed firms and thus tend to issue a first-time going-concern modified audit opinion to them. We also find that the positive association above is reinforced with capital market uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
his study investigates the impact of managerial overconfidence on auditors' going-concern modified audit opinion (GCO) decisions for financially distressed firms.
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Following Schrand and Zechman (2011) , we measure firm-specific time-variant managerial overconfidence and investigate its impact on auditors' GCO decisions using a sample composed of financially distressed firms that received FGCOs from 2001 to 2011. After controlling for the factors affecting auditors' GCO decisions, we find that the propensity to issue a FGCO is positively associated with CEO overconfidence, suggesting that auditors are more likely to issue FGCOs by adversely valuing the overconfident CEOs of financially distressed firms. Further analysis reveals that the positive association between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing a FGCO is more pronounced when capital market uncertainty is high, such as during the pre-SOX and global financial crisis periods.
Our study contributes to two important research streams on auditor reporting decisions and managerial overconfidence. First, we provide evidence that CEO overconfidence, a managerial cognitive bias, is an additional determinant affecting auditors' GCO decisions on financially distressed firms. Specifically, we find that auditors adversely value the overconfident CEOs of firms in financial distress and are more likely to issue FGCOs to such firms. Second, recent accounting studies of managerial overconfidence document the association between managerial overconfidence and a variety of corporate policies, such as financial misreporting and accounting conservatism; our study extends the extant literature by focusing on perceptions of managerial overconfidence. We provide evidence that auditors' perceptions of CEO overconfidence lead them to determine that overconfident CEOs are too risky to stabilize their firms' financial distress.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The literature is reviewed and the hypotheses are developed in section 2. In section 3, we present the study's research design and empirical model. The sample and data are described in section 4. In section 5, the empirical results are presented. Finally, the last section provides a summary and conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Literature Review

CEO Overconfidence
In the economics literature, humans are assumed to behave rationally and make an optimal decision, while psychological research shows that humans are not perfectly rational and have cognitive biases. Overconfidence, a cognitive bias, has been examined in the recent finance and accounting literature (e.g., Tate, 2005, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Hribar and Yang, 2011; Schrand and Zechman, 2011; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013) . Overconfidence is described as a behavioral or psychological bias leading to an overestimation of the future uncertain outcomes of current events. This overconfidence is mainly formed by the "better-than-average effect" (Svenson, 1981) , the tendency of humans to think of themselves as above average. The overestimation of future outcomes by overconfident CEOs may lead to excessive optimism, which could adversely influence firms' corporate policies or financial reporting decisions. Accordingly, Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overconfident CEOs produce a higher sensitivity between investments and free cash flows, implying overinvestment and lower investment efficiency. In terms of mergers and acquisitions, Billett and Qian (2008) use a dynamic measure of overconfidence to show that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with more acquisition decision making. Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident CEOs are more likely to execute value-destroying mergers and acquisitions and overpay for acquired firms. In addition, Deshmuk et al. (2013) report that overconfident CEOs prefer lower dividend payouts. Campbell et al. (2009) argue that CEO overconfidence is positively correlated with involuntary turnover. Contrary to these findings on the negative consequence of CEO overconfidence on corporate policy, Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) suggest that overconfident CEOs make more investments in innovation and achieve greater innovative success by efficiently utilizing research and development expenditures.
The recent accounting literature has studied the impact of CEO overconfidence on financial reporting behavior. For instance, examining 49 firms subject to the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Schrand and Zechman (2011) investigate the association between managerial over-optimism and earnings management. They propose two explanations for the earnings management of overconfident managers. One is that such mangers intentionally misstate financial reporting for their own personal interests. The other is that overoptimistic managers are inclined to issue more optimistic earnings forecasts and be involved in intentional misstatement in order to beat or meet earnings forecasts. Consistent with their argument, Schrand and Zechman (2011) find that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in fraudulent financial reporting to beat or meet their overoptimistic earnings expectations. Furthermore, Ahmed and Duellman (2012) show that overconfident CEOs are more likely to delay loss recognition, indicating less loss recognition conservatism. Presley and Abbott (2013) report that overconfident CEOs are more likely to restate previously issued financial statements. Overall, studies confirm that CEO overconfidence adversely affects firms' financial reporting behavior, reducing financial reporting quality and generating more earnings management, less use of conservative accounting, and more frequent restatements of previously reported financial statements.
The prior literature on GCOs, focusing on financial statement information, identifies a variety of client characteristics related to GCO decision making. For instance, the issuance of GCOs is negatively associated with profitability (e.g., Kida, 1980; Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch et al., 1987; Altman and McGough, 1974; Menon and Schwartz, 1987) , liquidity (e.g., Koh and Killough, 1990; Koh, 1991; Lennox, 1999; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995) , and firm size (e.g., McKeown et al., 1991; Mutchler et al., 1997; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001 ) while positively associated with leverage (e.g., Altman and McGough, 1974; Kida, 1980; Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch et al., 1987; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995) . In addition to financial statement variables, studies (e.g., Dopuch et al., 1987; Mutchler and Williams, 1990; DeFond et al., 2002) provide evidence that market variables such as return and its volatility as non-financial information are associated with GCO issuance. Most research finds that auditors are more likely to issue GCOs to firms with lower industry-adjusted return or higher return volatility. In terms of auditor independence, auditors are less likely to issue GCOs to firms with significant economic dependence (Geiger and Rama, 2003; Blay and Geiger) , whereas Reynolds and Francis (2000) and DeFond et al. (2002) find no association between economic dependence and propensity to issue GCOs. In addition, a recent study of Fargher et al. (2014) provides evidence that auditors are more likely to issue GCOs to financially distressed firms that have executive compensation structure with risk-taking incentives, suggesting that auditors adversely value CEOs with risk-taking motivation.
Auditors are also supposed to find GCO-mitigating factors (e.g., management's future financing plan) and evaluate their potential impacts on current going-concern uncertainty. Specifically, SAS No. 126 (AICPA 2012) requires auditors to evaluate management's plan to escape from current financial distress. Behn et al. (2001) find that management plans to raise capital from equity issuance or borrowings are negatively associated with GCO issuance.
Taken together, studies suggest that auditors seek to identify events or conditions affecting clients' goingconcern uncertainty, primarily based on financial statement information. When auditors detect a going-concern factor, they must identify and evaluate management's plans to mitigate the issuance of a GCO. Consequently, auditors' GCO decisions are made after considering both the going-concern status and the mitigating factors affecting the potential issuance of a GCO.
Hypothesis Development
According to SAS No. 126 (AICPA 2012) , if, after identifying conditions or events that violate an entity's going-concern assumption, the auditor detects a going-concern uncertainty, the auditor must obtain and evaluate management's plans (e.g., to sell assets or raise capital through issuing equity or borrowing) to mitigate the goingconcern uncertainty. The auditor has to assess the significance of management's plans to overcome the goingconcern uncertainty or the feasibility of future financing plans. More importantly, the auditor must assess if management is willing and able to implement its plans. Furthermore, when prospective financial information is critical to the success of the management plans, the auditor must thoroughly review its validity and reliability. This assessment should be based on knowledge of the firm, its business, and its management.
When assessing management along with the relevant financial information, the auditor should apply a professional skepticism. The financial information provided by overconfident CEOs may be unrealistically optimistic because, as mentioned, they are overoptimistic about future returns on current investments. While it is absolutely the auditor's responsibility if accepting plans by overconfident CEOs after considering all the relevant information, we expect that auditors can respond to CEOs' overconfidence in one of three ways: 1) positively, 2) negatively, or 3) neutrally.
There are positives to CEO overconfidence in terms of corporate policy and management ability. For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Galasso and Simcoe (2011) show that overconfident CEOs invest more in innovation and are more likely to achieve innovative success. Anderson et al. (2012) suggest that overconfident CEOs are more likely to have a higher social status, enhancing their social network and making them look more competent and capable than they are. Therefore, overconfident CEOs can be positively perceived by auditors making GCO decisions. However, there are also negatives to CEO overconfidence in terms of corporate policy and financial reporting behavior. Studies reveal the adverse consequence of CEO overconfidence, such as inefficient investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) , value-destroying mergers and acquisition (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) , increased likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting (Schrand and Zechman, 2011) , less use of conservative accounting (Ahmed and Duellman, 2012) , and more frequent restatements of previously reported financial statements (Presley and Abbott, 2013) .
Consequently, if an auditor believes that, in assessing a firm's going-concern uncertainty, the positives (negatives) of the firm's CEO overconfidence outweigh its negatives (positives), the CEO overconfidence will be a significant mitigating (contrary) factor for the auditor's substantial doubt about the firm's ability to continue as a going concern. In addition, if an auditor perceives that the positives (negatives) of the firm's CEO overconfidence do not significantly dominate its negatives (positives), the CEO overconfidence will be insignificant to the auditors' GCO decision making.
Therefore, we hypothesize as follows (at the form of null):
Hypothesis: There is no association between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing first-time going-concern audit opinions to financially distressed firms.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We test the above hypothesis using the logit model below: 
FGCO
= coded 1 if a firm received a going-concern modified audit opinion on the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion on the previous fiscal year's financial statements.
Managerial OC
= coded 1 if the sum of the following five dummy variables is equal to or greater than 3: 1) Excess investment is equal to 1 if excess investment is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, where excess investment is measured as the residual from a regression of total asset growth on sales growth, and 0 otherwise; 2) Net Acquisition is equal to 1 if the net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows are in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, and 0 otherwise; 3) Debt-to-Equity ratio is equal to 1 if the debt-to-equity ratio is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, where the debt-to-equity is measured as long-term debt plus short-term debt, deflated by the total market value of the firm measured as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book values of long-term debt and preferred stock and 0 otherwise; 4) Risk Debt is equal to 1 if either convertible debt or preferred stock is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise; 5) Dividend Yield is equal to 1 if the dividend yield is zero and 0 otherwise. Size = natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. LEV = debt-to-equity ratio, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. OCF = operating cash flows, measured as the cash flows from operating activities deflated by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Prob(Bankz) = probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewski, 1984) , measured as -4.803-3.599* (net income/total assets)+5.406*(total liabilities/total assets)-0.100*(current assets/current liabilities).
Lag Loss
= coded 1 if the firm reports net loss for the previous fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Investments = the sum of cash and cash equivalents and short-or long-term investments deflated by total assets. Discon OP = coded 1 if the firms report discontinued operation and 0 otherwise. Future Financing = coded 1 if the firm issues equity or borrows in the subsequent fiscal year and 0 otherwise.
Big4
= coded 1 if the firm's auditor is PWC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG and 0 otherwise. The Clute Institute
Log(Age) = natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was listed on a stock exchange. Return = the firm's buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year. Beta = the firm's systematic risk, estimated using a market model, over the fiscal year. Volatility = the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the fiscal year.
Log(Audit Fees)
= natural logarithm of audit fees over the fiscal year (in thousands).
P represents the probability of auditors issuing FGCOs to financially distressed firms and F denotes the normal cumulative distribution function. Following Dodd et al. (1984) and Loudder et al. (1992) , we define FGCO as a firm's receipt of a going-concern audit opinion on the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion on the previous fiscal year's financial statements. We build Managerial OC, a proxy for managerial overconfidence, following Schrand and Zechman (2011) . Also following Schrand and Zechman (2011), we measure Managerial OC at the firm level, coded 1 if the sum of the five dummy variables below is equal to or greater than three 5 :
Excess Investment = dummy variable equal to 1 if excess investment is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, where excess investment is measured as the residual from a regression of total asset growth on sales growth and 0 otherwise.
Net Acquisition
= dummy variable equal to 1 if net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows are in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year and 0 otherwise.
Debt-to-Equity ratio
= dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt-to-equity ratio is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, where the debt-to-equity ratio is measured as long-term debt plus shortterm debt divided by total market value (=the market value of equity + the book values of longterm debt + preferred stock) and 0 otherwise.
Risky Debt
= dummy variable equal to 1 if either convertible debt or preferred stock is greater than zero and 0 otherwise.
Dividend Yield
= dummy variable equal to 1 if dividend yield is zero and 0 otherwise.
Each of these criteria is based on the empirical findings of prior studies on the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate policies such as investing and financing activities and dividend policies. For instance, overconfident CEOs are more likely to make excessive investments (e.g., Tate, 2005, 2008; BenDavid et al., 2010) and value-destroying acquisitions (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2008) and prefer debt to equity (e.g., Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008) and risky debt with longer terms (e.g., Malmendier et al., 2011; Ben-David et al., 2007) while being less likely to pay dividends (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2007) . The first three criteria are measured by using a three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in a given year, each set equal to 1 if the value is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year and 0 otherwise.
Following the prior research, we control for a broad variety of client characteristics and mitigating factors affecting auditors' FGCO issuance. First, research shows that the likelihood of issuing GCOs is strongly associated with financial statement information, providing evidence that auditors are more likely to issue GCOs to firms of smaller size, higher leverage, lower liquidity, higher bankruptcy probability, and less profitability. Thus, we control for firm size (Size), debt-to-equity ratio (LEV), cash flows from operating activities (OCF), profitability (Lag Loss), and financial stability (Prob(Bankz)). We also consider the factors mitigating auditors' GCO decisions. DeFond et al. (2002) suggest that firms with more resources such as cash and investments are more likely to escape from financial difficulty. Behn et al. (2001) document that future financing plans or discontinued operations may help rescue financially distressed firms, thus mitigating auditors' GCO issuance. Thus, Investments, Discon OP, and Future Financing are included in the regression model as mitigating factors. Moreover, the Big Four auditors are more likely to issue GCO (Mutchler et al., 1997) and auditors are more likely to issue GCOs to younger firms (Dopuch et al., 1987; DeFond et al., 2002) . Thus, Big4 and Log(Age) are included. In addition to financial statement information, market information (i.e., non-financial statement information) is also correlated with the likelihood of 5 Another prevalent proxy for CEO overconfidence is an option-based measure, which is based on CEO's option holding behavior Tate, 2005, 2008) . The relevant data for the option-based measure are obtained from Execucom database, which is composed of relatively large companies. However, the firms that received a going concern modified audit opinion are smaller with financial distress. Therefore, when using an option-based measure as a proxy for CEO overconfidence, we cannot obtain test sample firms (i.e., GCO firms) enough to test the hypothesis in our study. As a matter of fact, we tried the option-based measure based on Tate (2005, 2008) , we could have only a few GCO firms. This measurement issue on CEO overconfidence could be a limitation of our study.
GCO issuance (DeFond et al., 2002) . We thus include three market-based measures: stock return, systematic risk, and stock return volatility. Return and Beta (Volatility) are expected to be negatively (positively) correlated with auditors' GCO decisions. I also include Log(Audit Fees) to control for auditor independence and client importance.
SAMPLE AND DATA
The main sample in this study consists of firms that received GCOs or unqualified audit opinions between 2001 and 2011. As mentioned previously, the FGCO firms are defined as those that received GCOs for the current fiscal year's financial statements but unqualified audit opinions for the previous fiscal year's financial statements. CLEAN-opinion (non-GCO) firms are defined as those that received unqualified audit opinions for the financial statements of both the current and previous fiscal years.
We collected financial data from the Compustat Industrial Annual files, stock and market returns data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CSRP) database, and audit opinion, auditor, and audit fee data from the Audit Analytics database. To identify FGCO firms, we start with a sample of 182,437 audit opinions drawn from the Audit Analytics database covering 2001 to 2011. Then, to identify firms that received qualified audit opinion or disclaimer of opinion on the current or previous financial statements, we merge the audit opinion sample above with the audit opinion sample from the COMPUSTAT database. We delete 90,191 firm-year observations with qualified audit opinions, disclaimers of opinions, or missing audit opinions on the current or previous financial statements. We also exclude 75,486 firm-year observations with missing managerial overconfidence, financial, market, auditor, or audit fee variables or on the utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) or financial (SIC code 6000-6999) industry because they concern regulatory industries with different operating environments. This process produces 16,760 firm-year observations. As in prior GCO issuance studies, we restrict the final sample to financially distressed firms, defined as firms with both a net loss and negative cash flows from operating activities. We thus identified 3,048 firm-year observations. We then excluded 306 financially distressed firm-year observations with GCOs on the firms' previous financial statements, generating 2,742 firm-year observations as a final sample, consisting of 192 FGCO firms and 2,550 CLEAN opinion firms. The sample selection procedure is described in detail in Table 1 , Panel A. Table 1 , Panel B shows the industry distribution of the sample firms; 63 (32.8%) of 819 sample firms in the drug and medical equipment industry received FGCOs on their current financial statements (the highest number), followed by computers (19.3%), miscellaneous equipment (8.9%), and service (8.3%). Table 1 Panel C presents the yearly distribution of the full sample by audit opinion type (FGCO vs. CLEAN opinion). Table 1 a FGCO firms are defined as those that received going-concern modified audit opinions for the current fiscal year's financial statements but unqualified audit opinions for the previous fiscal year's financial statements. b CLEAN opinion firms are defined as those that received unqualified audit opinions for the financial statements of both current and previous fiscal years. Table 2 reports the test result for the mean difference of all the variables used in the empirical model between FGCO (FGCO=1) and CLEAN-opinion firms (FGCO=0). As shown in Table 2 , the mean (0.23) of Managerial OC for FGCO firms is greater than that (0.19) for CLEAN opinion firms, but the mean difference is not significant (t-statistic=1.23). Concerning financial condition, as expected, FGCO firms have smaller firm size, higher debt-to-equity ratio, less operating cash flows, a higher probability of bankruptcy, and less profitability than do CLEAN-opinion firms, and all the mean differences are significant at the 1% level. Also as predicted, FGCO firms have lower stock return, lower systematic market risk, and higher stock return volatility than do CLEANopinion firms, and all mean differences are also significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that firms with poor financial condition, poor market performance, or higher market risk are more likely to receive GCOs on their current financial statements. Additionally, regarding mitigating factors deterring the issuance of GCOs, the mean (0.28 and 0.81, respectively) of Investments and Future Financing of FGCO firms are less than those (0.44 or 0.90, respectively) of CLEAN-opinion firms, and the mean differences are significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that firms with more quickly disposable assets such as investments or future financing plans such as the issuance of debt or equity are less likely to receive GCOs. Contrary to our expectation, Table 2 reports that the Big Four auditors are less likely to issue GCOs. Also, FGCO firms have significantly less audit fees than do CLEANopinion firms, implying a possible impairment of auditor's independence in making GCO decision. The mean of the other control variables of Discon OP and Log(Age) is greater for FGCO firms but is insignificant. Where: FGCO = coded 1 if a firm received a going-concern audit opinion on the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion on the previous fiscal year's financial statements.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis
Managerial OC
= coded 1 if the sum of following five dummy variables is equal to or greater than three: 1) Excess investment is equal to 1 if excess investment is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, where excess investment is measured as the residual from a regression of total asset growth on sales growth, and 0 otherwise. 2) Net Acquisition is equal to 1 if net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows are in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, and 0 otherwise. 3) Debt-to-Equity ratio is dummy variable equal to 1 if debt-to-equity ratio is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, and 0 otherwise. 4) Risk Debt is equal to 1 if either convertible debt or preferred stock is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 5) Dividend Yield is equal to 1 if dividend yield is zero, and 0 otherwise. Size = natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year. LEV = debt-to-equity ratio, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year. OCF = operating cash flows, measured as cash flows from operating activities deflated by total assets at the end of fiscal year. Prob(Bankz) = probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewski, 1984) , measured as -4.803-3.599*(net income/total assets)+5.406*(total liabilities/total assets)-0.100*(current assets/current liabilities) Lag Loss = coded 1 if the firm reports net loss for the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise Investments = cash and cash equivalents and short-or long-term investments deflated by total assets. Discon OP = coded 1 if the firms report discontinued operation, and 0 otherwise Future Financing = coded 1 if the firm issues equity or borrows in the subsequent fiscal year, and 0 otherwise Big4 = coded 1 if the firm's auditor is one of PWC, EY, Deloitte, KPMG, and 0 otherwise.
Log(Age)
= natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was listed on a stock exchange. Return = the firm's buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year Beta = the firm's systematic risk estimated using a market model over the fiscal year Volatility = the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the fiscal year.
Log(Audit Fees)
= natural logarithm of audit fees over the fiscal year (in thousands) ***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). Table 3 shows the correlations between the main variables used for the empirical analyses. As Table 3 shows, the correlation (0.02) between FGCO and Managerial OC is positive but low and insignificant. FGCO is significantly and positively correlated with Prob(Bankz) and Volatility and negatively correlated with Size, The Clute Institute Investments, Future Financing, Big4, Return, and Log(Audit_Fees) at the 1% level. All correlations except for that (0.67) between Size and Log(Audit_Fees) are below 0.5. Overall, the correlation results suggest that there is no significant multicollinearity problem in our research setting. Table 2 for the definition of variables. Table 4 reports the results of the logistic regression on the relationship between FGCO and managerial overconfidence after controlling for the factors affecting auditors' GCO decisions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable of FGCO, which is coded 1 if a firm receives a GCO on current financial statements but a clean opinion on the previous financial statements. Table 4 , Column 3 shows the logistic regression results for the impact of managerial overconfidence on FGCO issuance, where Managerial OC is measured at the firm level, using the five variables of firm characteristics used in Schrand and Zechman (2011) . According to the results in Table 4 , Column 3, Managerial OC, the test variable, is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that financially distressed firms with overconfident management are more likely to receive a FGCO. In other words, auditors consider overconfident management a going-concern factor in making GCO decisions. Consistent with the results in the univariate analysis in Table 2 , FGCO is significantly and negatively correlated with Size and OCF at the 1% level, suggesting that firms that are smaller or have less operating cash flows are more likely to receive GCOs. Moreover, FGCO is significantly and positively associated with Prob(Bankz) at the 1% level, indicating that firms with a higher possibility of bankruptcy are more likely to receive GCOs. Investments and Discon OP as mitigating factors for GCOs are significantly and negatively associated with FGCO at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively, and Future Financing has the expected sign but is not significant. These results indicate that firms with disposable resources to use in avoiding financial distress are less likely to receive GCOs. All market variables have the expected signs and are significant at the 1% level. Contrary to the univariate results in Table 2 , we find that firms with great leverage (Big4 or high Log(Audit_Fees)) are less (more) likely to receive FGCOs. 8 We thus find in the logistic regression results that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the issuance of FGCOs, suggesting that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to receive FGCOs after 
Multivariate Analysis
First-Time Going-Concern Audit Opinion Decision and Managerial Overconfidence
First-Time Going-Concern Audit Opinion Decisions and Managerial Overconfidence Under Capital Markets Uncertainty
During a recession, many firms experience financial difficulties, and many go bankrupt. Thus, auditors may be more cautious about the going-concern issue during recessions, especially for small and financially distressed firms. Managerial overconfidence may also be a more critical going-concern factor affecting auditors' audit opinion decisions. Thus, we test the impact of capital market uncertainty such as high-profile accounting scandals and the global financial crisis on the association between auditors' FGCO decisions and managerial overconfidence. Since 2000, U.S. capital markets have undergone high-profile accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) and the subsequent demise of Arthur Anderson. In response, the U.S. Congress passed SOX on July 30, 2002, to restore investor confidence and enhance corporate governance and financial reporting quality. Despite the enactment of SOX, however, investors believe that it will take time for it to restore the damaged capital markets. For each of the four subsamples above, we re-conduct the regression analysis in Table 4 . The results are shown in Table 5 . Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 present the regression results during the U.S. capital market crisis (2001) (2002) . The coefficient of Managerial OC is positive and significant at the 5% level. Columns 7 and 8 in Table 5 present the regression results for the global financial crisis period (2007) (2008) (2009) . As shown in Columns 7 and 8 in Table 7 , the coefficient of Managerial OC is positive and significant at the 5% level. Meanwhile, as shown in Columns 5, 6, 9, and 10 in Table 5 , during the post-SOX (2003-2006) and post-crisis (2010-2011) periods, the coefficients of Managerial OC are insignificant. Collectively, the results above suggest that, during the periods of capital market uncertainty, auditors are more likely to regard overconfident management as a going-concern factor and issue FGCOs to financially distressed firms. Table 2 for the definition of variables.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
FGCO Firms vs. Firms with Standard Unqualified Audit Opinion Reports
In the previous main regression analysis, the final sample is composed of two subsamples: 1) FGCO firms and 2) CLEAN opinion firms. we confined the CLEAN opinion firms to the firms with unqualified audit opinions. In this section, as a sensitivity analysis, we narrow down the CLEAN opinion firms into those with standard unqualified audit opinion reports. As a result, the sample decreases from 2,742 to 1,540 firm-year observations, consisting of 140 FGCO firms and 1,400 CLEAN opinion firms. First, we conduct a mean difference test between 140 FGCO firms and 1,400 CLEAN opinion firms. According to the (untabulated) results, compared to the results in Table 2 , the t-statistics (1.88) of Managerial OC are positive and significant at the conventional level, suggesting that GCO firms are more likely to have overconfident management. The results of the mean difference test of the other variables are similar to those in Table 2 .
Next, we re-run the regression model in Table 4 on the relationship between FGCO and management overconfidence. In the (untabulated) results, we find, consistent with those in Table 4 , that Managerial OC is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that overconfident management is a going-concern factor rather than a mitigating factor. This result reinforces the findings shown in Table 4 that, among financially distressed firms, those with overconfident management are more likely to receive FGCOs. The Clute Institute Finally, using the subsample of 1,540 firm-year observations above, we re-conduct the regression analyses in Table 5 on the impact of capital markets uncertainty (e.g., high-profile accounting scandals, global financial crisis) on the relationship between auditors' FGCO decisions and managerial overconfidence. The (untabulated) results show, consistent with the findings in Table 5 , that, during the U.S. capital markets crisis era, Managerial OC is positive and significant at the conventional level. During the global financial crisis, the coefficient of Managerial OC is positive but insignificant. Finally, as in the findings in Table 5 , there is no significant association between FGCO and Management OC during the post-SOX (2003-2006) or post-crisis (2010-2011) period. These results partially support the previous findings in Table 5 that capital market uncertainty reinforces the association between auditors' GCO decisions and management overconfidence.
CONCLUSION
Recently, academics have hotly debated the impact of managerial overconfidence on a variety of corporate decisions such as corporate investment, mergers and acquisitions, financing, dividend policies, earnings management, management forecasting, tax avoidance, financial misreporting, and accounting conservatism. However, few have studied how parties outside firms perceive managerial overconfidence. This study examines how auditors incorporate their perceptions of managerial overconfidence into their audit reporting decisions. We test the association between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing first-time going-concern audit opinions. We find that auditors are more likely to issue first-time going-concern audit opinions to financially distressed firms with overconfident CEOs, suggesting that auditors consider overconfident CEOs a going-concern factor rather than a mitigating factor. Further analyses reveal that the positive association between the likelihood of first-time going-concern audit opinion and managerial overconfidence is reinforced with capital market uncertainty (e.g., the global financial crisis period of 2007 to 2009).
In sum, consistent with the prior findings that CEO overconfidence negatively affects firm value, we provide evidence that auditors negatively value overconfident CEOs when making going-concern audit opinion decisions.
